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Abstract:
H.L.A.Hart’s seminal book The Concept of Law entails arguments which are also of
substantial importance for social theory: his claim that the existence of social and legal
norms presupposes the dissemination of an internal point of view among the members of
a social and legal community presents a serious challenge for any explanation of social
order. Hartmut Kliemt emphasizes this aspect of Hart’s work time and again in his own
writings—and surely with very good reasons. In my paper I will try to reconstruct Hart’s
theory in detail. I will argue that we have to clarify the different dimensions of the
concept of an internal point of view to be able to assess its consequences for a theory of
social and legal order—especially for a rational choice approach which at ﬁrst sight seems
to be incompatible with the concept of an internal point of view.
1. Introduction: Choosing the Right Explanandum
Already in his early writings Hartmut Kliemt prizes H.L.A.Hart’s analysis of
the structure of law and his concept of an internal point of view as a crucial
touchstone for every theory in the social sciences and especially rational choice
theory (Kliemt 1985, 223ff.; 1987; 1992; Kliemt and Zimmerling 1992). As most
social scientists, particularly in Germany, are oblivious of Hart’s theory of law,
this appreciation of Hart from the perspective of social theory was (and still is)
not very widespread. This is a serious shortcoming as Hart’s theory of law dis-
closes elements and relations in the realm of law which are of utmost interest
to general social theory too. Although his theory is primarily aimed at a general
analysis of the normative and logical constitution of a legal system, it is also
extremely helpful in clarifying the structure of this system as an empirical ex-
planandum. It is a common failing of social scientists to test their theories of
rules and norms by only using simple examples. But, obviously, the rules and
norms that govern societies are parts of complex systems with intricate internal
structures—this is not only true of legal rules but of many social norms. Any so-
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cial theory that claims universal applicability must, therefore, also prove itself
in its analysis and explication of these more complex phenomena. But what is
so exceptional about a system of legal rules?
It is of central importance here that legal systems essentially include rules
which are not just orders backed by sanctions—as common wisdom among many
social scientists may suggest—but power-transferring rules that endow actors
with certain competences and authority. The explanation of these rules is the
real challenge for all empirical theories of law—most of these theories, includ-
ing rational choice theories, have concentrated far too much on the ‘easy’ cases,
rules that are backed by sanctions, and too little on the ‘hard’ cases, rules that
confer power to enact sanctions: in Hart’s words they have focused too much on
the “primary” rules and too little on the “secondary” rules. But before a rule
backed by sanctions can help to explain the stability of social order, it must ﬁrst
be explained how the order of a legal system can establish—secondary—rules
that prescribe which—primary—rules are valid at all and should be enforced by
sanctions in the case of deviation.
Hart’s answer to this explanatory challenge is well-known: he claims that a
legal system can only exist if sufﬁciently many members of a legal community
adopt an “internal point of view” towards the fundamental rules of this system.
Hart believes that this is not only an empirically but also a logically necessary
condition for a legal system to exist—in fact he thinks that this applies to social
norms as well. This would have important—and in the case of rational choice
theory potentially fatal—consequences for any empirical theory of social and le-
gal order. Any theory with this focus has then to account for the dissemination
of an internal point of view when striving to explain the emergence and stability
of a legal system and even of social norms. Hartmut Kliemt’s interest in Hart’s
theory centred around this point: if Hart was right, he has presented conclu-
sive arguments against any theoretical approach that tries to explain the facts
of human interaction and social order only as the results of ‘extrinsic’ incen-
tives and adaptive strategies to empirical constraints. Kliemt accepted Hart’s
assumption that a widespread adoption of an internal point of view is indeed
a necessary condition at least for any developed legal systems to exist—leaving
open, however, whether these necessities should be interpreted as empirical or
logical necessities (Kliemt 1985, 237f.). In both cases it seems to be unavoidable,
though, to draw the conclusion that rational choice theory principally could not
cope with Hart’s challenge: rational choice theory can explain rule-following be-
haviour only as a sequence of opportunistically rational decisions—and not as a
result of an ‘internal acceptance’ of a norm. If this were true, the factual exis-
tence of social norms and legal systems alone would refute rational choice theory
as a universally applicable social theory.
In many discussions Hartmut and I both expressed and reinforced our mu-
tual conviction of the plausibility of the above line of reasoning. After coming
back to these issues many years later, I am now not as convinced as I once was
about our position and think that the problem is at least more complex than we
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will discuss three issues: ﬁrst, whether Hart indeed delivers a logically valid
argument that social rules—and, as a further consequence, legal rules as well—
can exist only if a sufﬁcient number of members of a social community adopt
an internal point of view. Secondly, whether he thereby presents a conclusive
argument that it is impossible to explain the existence of social rules and espe-
cially the existence of legal systems on the basis of rational choice theory. The
conclusion of the discussion of these issues will be that Hart’s ingenious anal-
ysis of the concept of law does not principally exclude the possibility that the
challenges he raises could be met by a rational choice theory of law and social
norms. One reason for this is that the concept of an internal point of view is
itself a complex theoretical notion with different dimensions. I will, therefore,
thirdly discuss brieﬂy, under what empirical conditions an incompatibility be-
tween rational choice theory and the existence of social and legal norms has to
be acknowledged.
Hart himself was not deﬁnitive with regard to this issue which, after all,
was not of special concern to him. His corresponding statements are ambiva-
lent. On the one hand, he contrasts the internal point of view explicitly with
an attitude that merely judges the consequences of action. On the other hand,
he concedes that the allegiance to social and legal rules “may be based on many
different considerations: calculations of long-term interest; disinterested inter-
est in others; an unreﬂecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish
to do as others do” (Hart 1994, 203). This does not sound like a swan song for
rational choice theories—however, Hart himself never delved more deeply into
the question how an internal point of view could be the result of ‘calculations of
long-term interest’. The following pages try to suggest some possible answers to
this question.
2. The Logic of Social Rules
H.L.A.Hart starts his famous analysis with the distinction between the inter-
nal and external aspect of rules.1 He claims that this distinction has “great
importance for the understanding not only of law but of the structure of any so-
ciety” (89). For Hart the internal aspect of rules distinguishes social rules from
habits: social rules share with social habits the external aspect “which consists
in the regular uniform behaviour which an observer could record” (56). But a
social rule has an internal aspect in addition insofar as the observable “regular
uniform behaviour” is the object of a normative standard which prescribes that
kind of behaviour. A normative standard has a notional meaning that could be a
subject of understanding and communication, it can be analyzed, applied to con-
crete cases, used as a premise for logical deduction or as a basis for conduct and
criticism, completely independent of the external aspect whether it is actually
1 Terminological remark: Hart uses the term ‘rule’, throughout also in contexts in which English-
speaking authors today would prefer the term ‘norm’ or ‘social norm’. In my paper I keep the
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observed or not. But as an essential element of a social rule it is—in contrast
to a habit—a necessary condition for “regular uniform behaviour” to occur. Hart
illustrates the internal aspect of rules with the rules of games: “Chess players
do not merely have similar habits of moving the Queen in the same way which
an external observer [...] could record. In addition, they have a reﬂective critical
attitude to this pattern of behaviour: they regard it as a standard for all who
play the game.” This reference to the internal aspect of rules ﬁnds its “charac-
teristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should,
‘right’ and ‘wrong’” (57).
If social habits are synonymous with observable regular uniform behaviour
the question about the conditions for a social habit to exist is easy to answer:
a social habit is a social fact if there is a certain kind of regular uniform be-
haviour. If social rules are in addition normative standards, the question about
the conditions for a social rule to exist is not as easy to answer—because it is
not self-evident how we can speak of the ‘existence’ of a normative standard as
something that is a ‘social fact’. But if we want to make the sociological state-
ment that a certain social rule empirically ‘exists’ in a group, then we must have
an idea what it means to say that a normative standard ‘exists’ as “a matter
of fact” (110). Or, to put it differently, we must know the truth conditions of a
norm-descriptive statement that gives a ‘value-free’ description of an empirically
existing standard in contrast to a norm-expressive statement that communicates
an approval and endorsement of a standard.
Hart’s answer is embodied in his concept of the external and internal point of
view. An external point of view exemplarily is the point of view of an observer
who can be content merely “to record the regularities of observable behaviour
in which conformity with the rules partly consists and those further regulari-
ties, in the form of the hostile reactions, reproofs, or punishments, with which
deviations from the rules are met” (89). Such knowledge might even enable
individuals to live among a group without the experience of unpleasant conse-
quences of their behaviour. But “what the external point of view, which limits
itself to the observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way
in which the rules function as rules in the lives of those who normally are the
majority of society”. They use rules “as guides to the conduct of social life, as the
basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment. [...] For them
the violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reac-
tion will follow but a reason for hostility. [...] They refer to the internal aspect of
rules seen from their internal point of view.” (90)
As Hart formulates emphatically in the Postscript, the internal point of view
embodies the “distinctive normative attitude” of “acceptance” which consists in
the standing disposition of individuals to take a rule both as a general standard
to be followed by the group as a whole and as a guide to their own future conduct
(255). Hart admits that a subclass of the members of a group can conﬁne them-
selves to an external point of view in being only concerned with rules when and
because they judge that unpleasant consequences are likely to follow violation.
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view would help to enforce and stabilize a social rule, it is in fact stronger: if
“the internal point of view is not widely disseminated there could not logically
be any rules” (117). For Hart it is a conceptual truth that “if a social rule is to
exist” sufﬁciently many members of a group “must look upon the behaviour in
question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole” (56).
Hart himself does not explicate the structure of his logical argument and
its premises further. The assumption that a factual dissemination of an inter-
nal point of view is a logically necessary requirement for the existence of social
rules would be justiﬁed if any plausible interpretation of the statement ‘nor-
mative standard S exists’ must refer to the empirical fact that people actually
accept this normative standard as a standard for behaviour. In other words: the
logical argument is sound if one of the truth conditions of the norm-descriptive
statement ‘members of G should Á’ is the truth of the descriptive statement
‘members of G accept that they should Á’. According to this interpretation, a
normative standard acquires ‘existence’ in the empirical world by the empirical
fact that this standard is subject to factual acceptance or approval.
So far we could reconstruct Hart’s premises and logical conclusion in the
following way:
P1: A social rule R exists in group G.
P2: If a social rule R exists in G, then a normative standard S exists in G.
P3: A normative standard S exists in G only if sufﬁciently many members of
G accept S as a normative standard.
P4: If a member i of G accepts S as a normative standard, then i sees R from
an internal point of view.
C: Sufﬁciently many members of G see R from an internal point of view.
To judge the plausibility and range of Hart’s ‘logical argument’, it requires fur-
ther clariﬁcation und explication. I will undertake this task in the next part
of the paper concerning the concept of social rules; this will be followed by an
application of the results to legal rules and an examination as to whether the
special characteristics of secondary rules and especially of a rule of recognition
shed new light on Hart’s concepts and arguments.
3. Social Rules and the Internal Point of View
I will try to explicate Hart’s concept of a social rule further by explicitly speci-
fying the crucial kinds of necessary conditions he mentions for a social rule to
exist:
A social rule R exists in a group G only if there is a sufﬁciently large subset
of G so that, for each individual i of the subset:30 Michael Baurmann
1. i understands R as a normative standard;
2. i prefers R as a normative standard for other members of G;
3. i prefers R as a normative standard for himself.
The overall condition demands that there must be a ‘sufﬁciently large subset’
of the members of a group who adopt an internal point of view. This condition
results from the requirement that the factual conformity to a rule must, to a
considerable extent, be produced by the fact that members of the group endorse
the rule, otherwise rule conformity would not be the result of the existence of a
normative standard but of other, ‘purely’ empirical factors. Of course, how many
members of a group will form a ‘sufﬁciently large subset’ to put a social rule into
practice will vary considerably with the empirical conditions in a group.
Condition 1 accentuates an obvious but nevertheless important point: We
can only speak of the existence of a social rule as a normative standard if enough
members of a population understand the difference between the descriptive
meaning of factual statements and the deontic meaning of normative state-
ments. People must know what it means that a standard prescribes or proscribes
a behaviour, and they must be able to interpret its content and to identify the
situations to which a standard applies—otherwise they would not at all be able
to regulate their own behaviour and that of others by use of and reference to
normative standards. In Hart’s words condition 1 demands that people are able
to refer to the internal aspect of rules.
Conditions 2 and 3 are meant to explicate the internal point of view in its core
sense. I split the concept into two separate issues for reasons which, hopefully,
will soon become clear. Condition 2 is a partial reformulation of Hart’s claim
that for a social rule to exist sufﬁciently many members of a group must ‘accept’
a rule as a normative standard to be followed by the group as a whole. The term
‘preference’ is used here in the wide sense to include wishes, aspirations and the
volitions of persons. I replace the term ‘acceptance’ with the term ‘preference’,
because analysing the attitudes and choices of individuals on the basis of their
preferences increases the awareness of opportunity costs and draws attention
to the comparative value of situations. The salience of an ‘acceptance’ can be
revealed only if alternative options and their relative evaluation are known:
I can ‘accept’ a rule in view of the danger of having no rule at all—but this
preference does not exclude that I would prefer a situation even more in which
a different kind of rule would exist or in which I personally can get rid of the
burdens of following the rule myself.
Having said this, the crucial question is whether condition 2 can count as
a logically necessary condition for the existence of social rules. To answer this
question, we have to resume the initial discussion as to whether any plausible
interpretation of the statement ‘normative standard S exists’ must refer to the
empirical fact that people actually accept—or ‘prefer’ as we may now say—this
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First, we must be aware that we are discussing this question from a socio-
logical point of view. That means that the term ‘existence’ refers to ‘empirical
existence’, i.e. existence as a ‘social fact’. Possible forms of a non-empirical ‘ex-
istence’ of rules are irrelevant from the perspective of descriptive social theory.
This does not mean that a sociologist must deny the claims of natural law theo-
ries or ethical cognitivism that rules exist ‘objectively’ as metaphysical entities
or that normative statements can be true or false. Even if claims like these are
justiﬁed, rules do not come to the attention of a sociologist before they ‘bridge
the gap’ to the empirical world of social practice. That does not exclude the pos-
sibility that people may believe that some rules exist ‘objectively’ or that it is
‘true’ that one should not behave in a certain manner. These kinds of normative
beliefs may be strong motivational forces and important subjects of explanation.
However, from an empirical point of view what exists are the beliefs and not the
rules independently of those beliefs.
What can bridge the gap between ‘normativity’ and the empirical? Such a
bridge is built by the preferences and wishes people have with regard to certain
forms of behaviour by themselves or others (Kelsen 1949, 31ff.; Weinberger 1981,
67ff.). Preferences and wishes regarding behaviour are empirical facts. But the
meaning of these preferences and wishes are normative standards: if I want you
to act in a certain way, the meaning of my will is that you should act in a certain
way. In this way normative standards as abstract, propositional entities can
become part of the real world—they are ‘transported’ by the factual aspirations
of people to shape and inﬂuence the behaviour of other people and their own.
Or, to put it the other way round, because people factually have preferences
and wishes with regard to their own behaviour and that of others, and because
the meaning of these kind of preferences and volitions is a normative standard,
normative standards could be more than ideal entities and become elements of
the real world.
Hence the crucial difference between a rule ‘on the blackboard’ that can be
the subject of an intellectual exercise, and an empirically existing rule is indeed
the factual ‘acceptance’ of the second—to use Hart’s terminology once again. The
special form of empirical existence of a normative standard ‘a should Á’ is the
fact that it is the meaning of an actual preference, wish or will; its hour of birth
is the moment in which at least one person as a ‘rule-author’ wants a to do Á
and is disposed to use the statement ‘a should Á’ as a norm-expressive state-
ment to verbalize his will—thereby imposing on a the role of a ‘rule-addressee’.
Sociologists, by the way, implicitly use this conception if they, as they often do,
use the term ‘expectation’ or ‘normative expectation’ to describe the conditions
of existence for social rules.
Therefore, assuming that we argued convincingly for the ‘bridging principle’
that a plausible interpretation of the statement ‘normative standard S exists’
must refer to the empirical fact that people actually do prefer S as a norma-
tive standard, we hereby also approved that condition 2 can count as a logically
necessary condition for a social rule to exist. As a social rule is addressed to
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that the group as a whole should conform to this rule, there must be sufﬁciently
many individuals who actually prefer the rule to be normative standard, at least
for the other members of their group. This kind of ‘acceptance’ as a ‘distinctive
normative attitude’ is indeed conceptually necessary to be able to speak of the
existence of a social rule.
Condition 3 states that a sufﬁcient number of members of a group have to
prefer a social rule also as a normative standard for themselves. The fulﬁlment
of this condition is, of course, not implied by the fulﬁlment of condition 2. Indi-
viduals as rule-authors can prefer all other members of their group to conform to
a rule, whereas they themselves could deviate and disobey the rule. That does
not mean that they will always be able to realise this preference—they would
prefer such a situation, but the situation can be such that deviation would not
be a sensible choice.
It is obvious that for Hart condition 3 is a constitutive element of the internal
point of view. ‘Acceptance’ of a social rule as a normative standard includes for
Hart to accept this standard as a guide to one’s own conduct. The preference of
an individual to have all other members of a group conform to a rule must be
accompanied by a preference for his own conformity to count fully as exempliﬁ-
cation of an internal point of view. But as an internal point of view is actually
composed of these different dimensions, we can analyse them one by one and
ask in relation to each separate aspect whether it is a logically necessary condi-
tion for a social rule to exist. To use handy terminology we can call a preference
according to condition 2 an ‘internal point of view in the enforcement sense’, and
a preference in terms of condition 3 an ‘internal point of view in the compliance
sense’.
Is condition 3—in addition to condition 2—also a logically necessary condi-
tion for the existence of a social rule as a normative standard? The crucial ques-
tion is whether condition 3 adds an indispensable element for the truth of the
norm-descriptive statement ‘the members of G should Á’. The answer is ‘no’: if
enough individuals in G prefer other members of G to conform to a rule R, then
R can be addressed to everyone in G because there can be a rule-author for every
member of G who wants him or her to conform to R—even if nobody prefers R as
a normative standard for himself. Therefore, the conceptual condition that we
can speak of a social rule that demands that all individuals of a group ‘should’
act in a certain way is met already by the requirements of condition 2.
Hart himself implicitly ratiﬁes this conclusion because he does not claim that
an internal point of view must be shared by all members of a group. It follows
from this concession that a social rule can also exist for people who do not accept
this rule at all—neither in an ‘enforcement sense’ nor in a ‘compliance sense’.
Nevertheless, we can still say that these people ‘should’ act in the way a social
rule demands of them. But if ‘acceptance’ of a rule as a normative standard for
one’s own behaviour is not a necessary condition for the existence of this rule,
then this must also hold true for individuals in their role as rule-authors. They
can make it a reality for other people to be obliged to act in a certain way with-
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minology of ‘ought’, ‘must’ and ‘should’ in the interaction with rule-addressees,
criticise them for deviation and can agree that rules ‘should’ be normative stan-
dards for their group without adopting this point of view for their own individual
behaviour.
To sum up, there is neither a logical reason why individuals could not at
the same time be rule-authors and exclude themselves from the role of rule-
addressees; nor is there a logical reason why, under such conditions, we could
not speak of the existence of a social rule if the other conditions are fulﬁlled. It
could be a situation in which, in fact, all members of a group would prefer all
others except themselves to conform to a rule but in which, nevertheless, most or
all of them would actually conform—for example because of the desire to please
others or to enjoy their esteem, the incentives of reciprocal behaviour, a system
of mutual sanctioning or the special authority or power of some of the group
members. As long as there are rule-authors who want a rule to be followed as a
normative standard, the minimal conceptual prerequisites for the existence of a
social rule have been realised.
That does not imply that condition 3 that covers the internal point of view
in the compliance sense is irrelevant. Its relevance becomes salient if we do not
interpret it as a logically but empirically necessary condition for a social rule
to exist. This thesis again has some plausibility and is worthwhile discussing.
But before we do so, we should examine the claim that the logically necessary
conditions to speak of the existence of a social rule exclude a rational choice
theory of social rules.
4. Social Rules and Rational Choice
Condition 1 demands that an individual understands the deontic meaning of a
normative standard, knows the difference between a prescription and a descrip-
tion and is able to identify situations in which a rule is applicable. The rational
choice view of an actor does not exclude such an understanding of the internal
aspect of a rule and the different properties of ‘is’ and ‘ought statements’. A ra-
tional actor will recognize if other actors prefer him to act in a certain way—for
example, to cooperate instead of defecting—and will understand that these ac-
tors do not believe that he actually will act in a certain way but that he should
act according to their wishes. He will be able to grasp the meaning of a ‘norm-
expressive’ statement in which they may communicate their will to him. It is
also obvious vice versa that in many situations a rational actor himself will have
the wish and the preference that other individuals act in a certain manner—
and he will be likewise able to understand that to communicate his intentions
to them means to express that they should act in a certain manner, in contrast
to just stating his empirical expectations about their actual behaviour. More-
over, there is nothing that would inhibit a rational actor from expressing his
wishes by using the ‘normative language’ of ‘ought’, ‘should’ and ‘must’, ‘right’
and ‘wrong’—because it is the very language that communicates to others the34 Michael Baurmann
meaning and content of his wishes as a precondition that they actually can fulﬁl
his aspirations.
Certainly, the fact alone that other individuals want an actor to conform to a
rule and insofar should act in a certain way does not as such create additional
incentives on the side of a homo oeconomicus who acts straightforwardly accord-
ing to the principles of expedient choice. The fact alone that he ‘should’ act in a
certain way has no genuine motivational force for him, it is not an independent
reason for acting as long as the preferences of other people are not transformed
into external constraints and change his expected payoffs. But a rational actor
could be motivated very strongly by the actions that rule-authors may perform
as a consequence of their preferences, and he may interpret their wants and
wishes as indicators of their probable behaviour.
From the perspective of a rule-author, of course, things look different: if a
rational actor has the preference that other persons act in a certain way, he
has a good prima facie reason to be motivated by this fact and to act according
to his wishes—given that in view of the situational restrictions such acting is
a utility-maximising choice for him. However, a rationally acting rule-author
can express that a rule-addressee should act in a certain way and he can try
to enforce his will without putting himself into the shoes of a rule-addressee or
being motivated himself to conform to the rule.
This leads to condition 2, the internal point of view in the enforcement sense.
This condition states than an individual prefers a rule as a normative standard
for other members of his group—but not necessarily also for himself. It is evi-
dent that a preference of this kind is perfectly compatible with preferences that
rational utility-maximisers reveal in many situations. The ‘classical’ examples
are situations with the incentive structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In PD-
situations a rational actor will prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection or,
to put it into the terminology of rules, he will prefer general conformity to a rule
that prescribes cooperation to general deviation from such a rule—however, as
a consequence of his opportunism he would prefer even more if all others con-
formed to this rule and he himself could deviate and hence be free from the costs
of conformity. That does not exclude the possibility that a rule of cooperation
can evolve with a high degree of general conformity. Even if all individuals ulti-
mately preferred unilateral deviation, there are several mechanisms that could,
nonetheless, produce reciprocal rule following. Rational choice theory offers
quite a well-equipped toolbox of instruments by which rational actors—given
appropriate empirical conditions—can induce effective incentives to conform to
social rules, so that mutual conformity and not mutual deviation becomes the
equilibrium.
But the important conclusion here is conceptual and not empirical: if it is in-
deed obvious that a rational utility-maximiser is predestined to be a rule-author
because as a thoroughly self-interested actor he is predestined to wish that other
people should act in a way to serve his personal interests, then it is indeed nearly
trivial that he will regularly fulﬁl condition 2. The world of rational utility-
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which, indeed, all members of a group could fulﬁl this condition without one of
them accepting a rule as a normative standard for his own behaviour. Neverthe-
less, we can say that, as rule-authors, they take an internal point of view—in the
enforcement sense—and adopt a ‘distinctive normative attitude of acceptance’:
if they want a rule to be followed, they will express that people ‘should’, ‘ought’
or ‘must’ behave in a certain way and “for them the violation of a rule is not
merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason
for hostility”. The rule—or rather their preferences and their wishes—will be a
basis for claims, demands for conformity, criticism and punishment of deviation.
And, as in PD-situations, they could even express their preference for mutual
conformity to mutual deviation, or to use Hart’s words, they could look upon the
behaviour in question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a
whole.
Thus a rational choice explanation can also cope with Hart’s justiﬁed claim
that there could not logically be any social rules if all members of a group look
upon the behaviour in question merely as an option that must be judged ac-
cording to its pleasant or unpleasant consequences—or, to put the same issue
differently, if all members of a group act only as rule-addressees and not as rule-
authors. But rational actors could very well differentiate between consequences
of their own behaviour and consequences of the behaviour of others, and if they
are in the role of rule-authors, they do not judge a prescribed behaviour accord-
ing to the pleasant or unpleasant consequences it would have if they performed
this behaviour themselves, but according to the pleasant or unpleasant conse-
quences it would have if others performed this behaviour. Acting as rule-author
and using normative standards as guides to the conduct of social life does not
exclude consequence-driven decisions. Rational and opportunistic actors are not
restricted to an external point of view “which limits itself to the observable reg-
ularities of behaviour”—instead they can use normative standards to produce
observable regularities of behaviour.
We can conclude that the conceptual conditions for a social rule to exist do
not logically exclude a rational choice explanation. Hart is right that it is a con-
ceptual truth that the existence of a social rule implies reference to an internal
point of view—but, as shown, only in the enforcement sense, which seems to ﬁt
easily with a rational actor approach.
However, as already announced, we can interpret Hart’s claim that a ‘full’
internal point of view—in the enforcement as well as in the compliance sense—
is a necessary condition for a social rule to exist as the empirical hypothesis
that at least a relevant subset of a group must accept a rule as a normative
standard for their own behaviour to ensure a sufﬁcient level of compliance. It
could be a fact that social rules cannot evolve and exist if all members of a group
as rule-addressees reveal an ultimate preference for deviation.
Would this additional requirement preclude a rational choice explanation?
First of all, as Hart emphasizes himself, especially in the Postscript, the ‘accep-
tance’ of a rule as a normative standard for one’s own behaviour must not reﬂect
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an internal point of view is compatible with the proviso to conform to a rule only
on condition that enough other members of a group conform to the rule as well:
the “general conformity of a group” can be “part of the reasons which its individ-
ual members have for acceptance” (255). Therefore, the ﬁrst question to discuss
is whether an internal point of view that is based on this kind of conditional
rule-conformity is compatible with a rational choice approach.
Hart’s initial illustration of an internal point of view proves just that. The
initial illustration is playing chess (57): if people want to play chess they want
their partner to conform to the rules of chess playing and they prefer to conform
to these rules themselves—and they use these rules to evaluate their own be-
haviour and the behaviour of others. But this phenomenon does not confront
rational choice theory with a signiﬁcant explanatory challenge: homo oeconomi-
cus is able to play chess!
Homo oeconomicus is able to play chess because he can maintain coordina-
tion. A state of coordination can be characterized, ﬁrstly, by the fact that there
is not only one possibility to coordinate the actions of individuals, but that all
persons involved prefer coordination of their actions to non-coordination; and,
secondly, that successful coordination is an equilibrium so that everyone prefers
to stick with the common practice as long as the others do as well—or, to phrase
it in the terminology we have used so far: individuals prefer a coordinating
rule as a normative standard for their own behaviour on the condition that suf-
ﬁciently many others also conform to this rule. The payoff structure in such
situations does not allow single actors to make themselves better off by unilat-
eral deviation. Consequently, if a social rule solves a coordination problem, then
rational actors will have an incentive to adopt an internal point of view also
in the compliance sense—as a strategy of conditional compliance—and the rule
will be self-sustaining as a normative standard for ‘the group as a whole’. For
each individual the rule will be an effective reason to act: the rule ‘you should
drive on the left side of the road’ is a reason to drive on the left side of the road
as long as an individual believes that other road users also act according to that
rule and drive on the left.
Hence the decision to promote, enforce and follow a coordinating rule as a
general standard for a group is not alien to individuals who strive to maximize
their personal utility. If social rules solve coordination problems, then they are
not dependent on artiﬁcial extrinsic incentives or on utility-dominating intrin-
sic motivation: individuals who are only interested in the expected pleasant or
unpleasant consequences of their actions will follow coordinating rules out of
self-interest and rational calculation of their payoffs and will use them as guide-
lines for their own conduct—it will be ‘right’ for them to conform, and ‘wrong’ to
defect, and they can state that they themselves should do as the rules prescribe.
To illustrate the nature of social rules with the example of rules for games or
trafﬁc rules, as Hart often does, is, however, misleading in some respect. Many
social rules are embedded in a different setting: the paradigmatic situation that
creates a demand for social rules is not a situation that is just in need of coor-
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motive structure of conﬂict and consent like—typically—a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
PD-situations are situations in which—like in situations characterised by a co-
ordination problem—individuals prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection
but in which they also—in contrast to a coordination problem—prefer unilateral
defection. Consequently, in a PD-situation a rule that prescribes cooperation
does not create a self-sustaining equilibrium like rules that designate the solu-
tion for a coordination problem.
Core social rules—like the ones Hart mentions himself as a minimum con-
tent of a secularized ‘natural law’ (185ff.)—that forbid killing, robbing, stealing,
betraying, insulting, lying and the breach of promises or contracts, are rules
that in the ﬁrst place do not emerge as reactions to coordination problems but
as reactions to negative externalities of certain actions and temptations to act
at the expense of other people. These rules initially demand a sacriﬁce from the
rule-addressees and impose costs on them. And they are not ‘conventional’ as
their content is not arbitrary like driving on the right or on the left.
To account for these additional complexities must not undermine a rational
choice explanation of social rules that includes an internal point of view in the
compliance sense. It is true that in PD-situations rational actors would have
no incentives to accept a rule as normative standard for their own behaviour,
because even and especially if all others conformed to the rule, it would be ad-
vantageous for them to deviate. However, empirical conditions can prevail that
transform the original cooperation problem into a less demanding coordination
problem. This can be accomplished in iterated PD-situations when interactions
are repeated between actors who recognise each other and remember the history
of their interchange, or if information of their behaviour is spread through infor-
mational networks that communicate the reputation of persons to third parties.
Under circumstances like these, conditional cooperation can become an expedi-
ent choice and a social rule can help to solve the remaining coordination problem
of selecting a particular equilibrium strategy to secure reciprocal expectations.
The upshot is: if it were indeed an empirically necessary condition that the
stable existence of social rules is dependent on a conditional preference for rule-
conformity, then this would restrict the possible empirical circumstances under
which rational actors could establish social rules, but it would not exclude a ra-
tional explanation of social rules in principle. However, this compatibility is de-
pendent on certain empirical circumstances and the robustness of the emerging
social rules will be limited because the ultimate preferences of the actors remain
unchanged: they would still prefer a situation in which they could deviate while
others are conforming. This preference would become effective if appropriate
opportunities opened up—for example, if one’s action remained undisclosed or
were insigniﬁcant for the aggregated result. One could suspect that the empir-
ical preconditions under which a rational actor would choose an internal point
of view in the compliance sense would be too restrictive in many cases for a
rational choice explanation of social rules.38 Michael Baurmann
It is, therefore, not so far-fetched to imagine situations in which an atti-
tude of conditional cooperation could not be explained from a rational choice
perspective—and under which, on the other hand, the hypothesis that social
rules can only exist if enough individuals are conditional rule-followers would be
especially plausible. This would be the case if it is not possible to transform coop-
eration problems into coordination problems because too much mobility under-
mines the continuity of relations and interactions, too much anonymity prevents
the monitoring of actions, or large numbers devaluate individual contributions
to public goods or produce cascades of defection. Under these circumstances, to
conform to a rule on condition that others do as well would not be a rational,
utility-maximising decision (Baurmann and Kliemt 1995).
Attitudes of conditional compliance under these conditions could neverthe-
less secure the existence of social rules if sufﬁciently many members of a group
preserved these attitudes against the temptation to deviate and defect. In fact,
such an attitude as a preference for mutual conformity to unilateral deviation
would also have the potential to transform cooperation problems into coordina-
tion problems (Bicchieri 2006, 26f.)—but this time as the result of an intrinsic
motivation for conditional cooperation and not on the basis of extrinsic incen-
tives that make conditional cooperation an advantageous strategy. Thus, this
‘solution’ is no longer compatible with a rational choice approach. We can call
such an ‘a-rational’ attitude of conditional cooperation an internal point of view
in the commitment sense because it presupposes a ‘commitment’ to a norma-
tive standard independent of the fact whether conformity to this standard is an
expedient choice or not.
We could go further and speculate about an even stronger version of an inter-
nal point of view in a categorical sense—meaning that individuals are motivated
to conform unconditionally to a social rule, irrespective of whether others con-
form to it or not and irrespective of whether it is an advantageous strategy or
not. Such a categorical commitment could be empirically necessary for the ex-
istence of a social rule if it were typical for rule-addressees to have notoriously
insufﬁcient information about the behaviour of others, if unconditional compli-
ance were necessary to start the emergence of social rules, or if actors were not
able to solve certain coordination problems without at least some of them prac-
tising categorical conformity to a rule (Lahno 2009).
5. Rules of Recognition and the Internal Point of View
When Hart turns to the foundations of a legal system, he claims that a rule of
recognition as the ultimate rule of a legal system is a paradigmatically clear in-
stance of a rule that only exists if sufﬁciently many members of a group adopt
an internal point of view: “The use of unstated rules of recognition, by courts
and others, in identifying particular rules of the system is characteristic of the
internal point of view. Those who use them in this way thereby manifest their
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characteristic vocabulary different from the natural expressions of the external
point of view.” (102) The statement ‘it is the law that ...’ is an example of one
assessing a situation by reference to rules which one acknowledges ‘as appropri-
ate for this purpose’. Hart calls this an internal statement “because it manifests
the internal point of view and is naturally used by one who, accepting the rule
of recognition and without stating the fact that it is accepted, applies the rule
in recognizing some particular rule of the system as valid” (102). The difference
between internal and external statements is for Hart especially salient “when
we consider how the judge’s own statement that a particular rule is valid func-
tions in judicial decision; [...] he plainly is not concerned to predict his own or
another’s ofﬁcial action. His statement that a rule is valid is an internal state-
ment recognizing that the rule satisﬁes the test for identifying what is to count
as law in his court, and constitutes not a prophecy of but part of the reason for
his decision.” (105)
In his summary of the role of the internal point of view in a legal system,
Hart resumes that the ofﬁcials and especially the courts must regard the ulti-
mate rule of recognition “from the internal point of view as a public, common
standard of correct judicial decision, and not as something which each judge
merely obeys for his part only” (116). And Hart emphasizes explicitly that “this
is not merely a matter of the efﬁciency or health of the legal system, but is logi-
cally a necessary condition of our ability to speak of the existence of a single legal
system”. He continues with the explanation that “if only some judges acted ‘for
their part only’ on the footing that what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law,
and made no criticisms of those who did not respect this rule of recognition, the
characteristic unity and continuity of a legal system would have disappeared”
(116).
In reconstructing Hart’s arguments I will start with his fundamental as-
sumption that to speak of the existence of a single legal system presupposes
the existence of an ultimate rule of recognition. Accordingly the conditions for
a rule of recognition to exist are closely intertwined with the conditions for a
legal system to exist—while it is crucial to consider the different existence con-
ditions for a rule of recognition and other rules of a legal system. The validity
and existence of subordinated legal rules is based on a rule of recognition as the
‘highest’ rule of a legal system, but the existence of a rule of recognition itself,
that is one of Hart’s central claims, can be based only on non-legal factors, on a
certain form of social practice—in this respect a rule of recognition is an element
of a subclass of social rules with special features. The question to be discussed
is whether these special features imply new dimensions for our discussion. Does
Hart’s analysis of the structure of a legal system shed new light on the salience
and characteristics of an internal point of view?
One new aspect could be associated with the concept of an ‘internal state-
ment’ that Hart coins to capture the unique way in which members of a legal
system use a rule of recognition to identify other rules of the system. The dis-
tinctive feature of an internal statement is associated with the fact that a rule of
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of action but establishes criteria to identify other rules as valid. The statement
that a rule is valid—‘it is the law that ...’—is a statement recognising that the
rule satisﬁes the test for identifying what is to be counted as law. Those who use
rules of recognition in this way thereby—according to Hart—manifest their own
acceptance of them as guiding rules and as common standards of correct judicial
decision and not as something which they merely obey for their part only.
To assess this argument we have to clarify the deontic meaning of a rule
of recognition. The example ‘what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’ in-
dicates a central point: a rule of recognition is, at least in all developed and
dynamic legal systems, a power-conferring rule that authorises certain actors to
be legal rule-authors, or ‘legislators’ (Kelsen 1949, 110ff.). Hence, the deontic
meaning of a rule of recognition is the deontic meaning of a power-conferring
rule. This meaning becomes clear if we examine the hierarchical structure of
a legal system: a law as a primary rule is a normative standard demanding
that people should behave in a certain manner. If a power-conferring rule as
a—secondary—rule of recognition determines what counts as valid laws, it de-
termines under what conditions people should actually do what a primary rule
demands—and the condition it states is that the rule was enacted by a certain
legislator L as an authorised source of law. By enacting laws, legislators ex-
press their will that people should conform to the rules which are embodied in
these laws. Therefore, the deontic meaning of a power-conferring rule is that
individuals should act as the authorised actor wants them to act: ‘a should Á if
L wants a to Á’. If the validity of a primary rule is based on its deduction from
a power-conferring rule, it demands conformity on condition that it expresses
the will of a certain authority which is designated by the power-conferring rule
(Weinberger 1981, 60ff.; Baurmann 2000).
On this basis we can return to the analysis of an internal statement that is
based on a rule of recognition. Suppose a judge declares that in a certain case
‘it is law that Mr. Smith has to be sent to prison for two years’. What could be
the content of the law to which the judge refers in this internal statement? For
example: ‘anyone who steals should be sent to prison for two years.’ In declaring
that Mr. Smith has to be sent to prison for two years, the judge follows the
prescription of the law and applies it to a certain case. His doing so is normally
the result of the fact that he applies another, a secondary rule, namely the rule
of recognition that deﬁnes which primary rules count as valid laws—and, as a
power-conferring rule, it is deﬁning valid laws by prescribing that judges and
other ofﬁcials should decide according to the will of the legislator.
But under these conditions the internal statement of a judge expressing that
a particular rule is valid and that ‘it is the law that ...’ can just be a result
of his rule-obeying behaviour and a consequence of the fact that he conforms to
the rule of recognition which demands that he should act according to the will
of the legislator. We can, notwithstanding, still agree with Hart: ‘His statement
that a rule is valid is an internal statement recognizing that the rule satisﬁes
the test for identifying what is to count as law in his court, and constitutes
not a prophecy of but part of the reason for his decision.’ And, of course, theThe Internal Point of View as a Rational Choice? 41
judge must refer to the internal aspect of rules as normative standards and must
understand their deontic meaning to assess whether they are ‘appropriate for
a certain purpose’ and to draw the correct normative conclusions in regard to
the facts of the case before him—but all this does not prove that judges who
are acting in this way ‘thereby’ manifest their own acceptance of the rule of
recognition! They have to adopt the cognitive attitude of a ‘hermeneutic point
of view’ (MacCormick 2008, 53ff.) but not the volitional attitude of an internal
point of view to follow and to apply a rule of recognition and to discover whether
certain primary rules satisfy the criteria for valid laws or not.
To subordinate oneself under the will of a legislator because it is demanded
by a rule of recognition does not, therefore, logically imply that a judge or of-
ﬁcial must think that “what he does is the right thing both for himself and for
others to do” (115). Also judges who abide by a rule of recognition only reluc-
tantly because they would prefer a different constitutional set up and are only
concerned with the material and social beneﬁts of their professional role could
understand that a rule of recognition applies to certain cases and can, in follow-
ing this rule for extrinsic incentives, state ‘it is law that ...’. Contradicting Hart,
it is—logically—possible that the attitude of a judge—indeed of all judges—can
be restricted to the external point of view that a rule of recognition is only “some-
thing demanding action from him under threat of penalty; he may obey it out of
fear of the consequences, or from inertia, without thinking of himself or others as
having an obligation to do so and without being disposed to criticize either him-
self or others for deviations.” (115) A judge can see the rule of recognition only as
something demanding action from him, and the reason for his obedience could
be merely a calculation of the cost-beneﬁt ratio of his options and the amount of
his pay checks. Thus there is no essential difference between a judge and other
rule-addressees—the difference is only that, in his case, the prescribed action
consists in applying a secondary rule ﬁrst to identify the primary rule he has to
follow.
Of course, as in the case of other social rules as well, a rule of recognition can-
not exist as a normative standard in a group if all members of a legal community
only act as rule-addressees and not as rule-authors. There must be a sufﬁciently
large subgroup who prefer the rule of recognition as the normative standard of
correct judicial decision at least for other members of the legal community—who
adopt an internal point of view in the enforcement sense. This demand will be
primarily addressed to judges and other ofﬁcials of the legal system: obviously
it is true that a legal system which is integrated by a rule of recognition can only
exist if most of the judges and other ofﬁcials are ready to follow this rule—for
whatever reasons.
The dissemination of an internal point of view in the enforcement sense is
thus, once again, a conceptual condition, logically connected with the existence
of a rule of recognition as a normative standard. But, as it is true of social rules
in general, this condition does not imply an internal point of view in the compli-
ance sense, meaning that members of a legal community must prefer a rule of
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a legal system in which all judges prefer a certain rule of recognition as a com-
mon standard but try to deviate from it if there is a chance to realise some extra
gains. Nevertheless, it could be stated that a rule of recognition exists in this
legal community. Moreover, it is logically and indeed also empirically conceiv-
able that the unity and continuity of a legal system can be ensured even against
the preferences and convictions of judges and other administrative ofﬁcials. A
small group of powerful political actors can enforce a rule of recognition—‘der
Führerwille ist die höchste Rechtsquelle’—and create a system of control and
oppression in which courts and other legal institutions obey this rule from an
external point of view for prudential reasons only: because they are afraid of
social pressure, punishment or other disadvantages. As the experience with au-
thoritarian systems proves, it is absolutely possible that a legal system including
an effective rule of recognition can exist even when every judge merely obeys ‘for
his part only’.
But even under such conditions, it is still true that a judge would not use
the rule of recognition in court to predict his own or others’ ofﬁcial actions. His
statement that a rule is valid law remains an internal statement referring to
the internal aspect of rules and recognising that a rule satisﬁes the test for
identifying what is to count as law in his court, it still would not constitute a
prophecy but a reason for his decision. He will understand and use the rule of
recognition from a ‘hermeneutic point of view’ as a normative standard—even if
he follows the rule against his preferences and convictions.
So far Hart’s assumption that more than an internal point of view in the
enforcement sense is logically a necessary precondition of being able to speak of
the existence of a single legal system seems to be refuted: for the existence of a
rule of recognition the same conceptual conditions are necessary as in the case
of a social rule in general—in this respect we are in line with Hart. But again,
as in the general case, we can treat Hart’s point as a hypothesis that an internal
point of view in the compliance sense is empirically a necessary condition for the
existence of at least some legal systems. I will come back to this point soon.
6. Rules of Recognition and Rational Choice
If we check whether the conceptual requirements for a rule of recognition are
compatible with a rational choice approach we could recapitulate, mutatis mu-
tandis, the arguments already developed in the general case. To start with,
there is no reason why a rational utility-maximiser should not understand the
deontic meaning of a power-conferring rule: homo oeconomicus is not only able
to play chess, he can also play soccer and understand that the rule which em-
powers a person as a referee demands that the players act according to the will
of the referee. If rational actors are addressees of a rule of recognition of a legal
system, they will comprehend that this rule prescribes that they should do Á if
the legislator wants them to do Á. If they are rule-authors, they will know that
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the rule ‘all members of G should Á if L wants the members of G to Á’. There
is nothing inherent in the rational actor model that prevents the attribution of
a ‘hermeneutic’ ability to understand the deontic meaning of power-conferring
rules to a rational actor.
Additionally, it seems to be obvious that rational and self-interested actors
can have preferences for power-conferring rules as well as preferences for certain
primary social rules—the fact that preferences for power-conferring rules are
quite congruent with rationality and self-interest has already been established
by Hobbes. It is a trivial truth that under quite common circumstances it is in
the fundamental interest of individuals to establish an authority in their group
who has the power of collective decision-making and is able to enact binding
rules that are effectively followed. Authoritative coordination can have a greater
expected utility than spontaneous regulation processes. According to Hart, a
rule of recognition is ﬁrst of all a therapy for the disease of uncertainty about
the content and scope of the rules of a group (92)—and a situation of uncertainty
about which rule is valid, under which condition a rule will be enforced and
when one has to expect sanctions is, of course, also a problematical situation for
rational utility-maximisers for whom the ability to form reliable expectations of
their future is of substantial importance.
Moreover, rational utility-maximisers will not be indifferent regarding the
content of a rule of recognition and can have good reasons to prefer a rule of
recognition that demands of judges and other ofﬁcials to follow the will of a
‘legitimised’ legislator and not their personal proclivities and convictions (Bau-
rmann 1996, 129ff.). A preference to live under a rule of law is nothing alien
to rational actors—even if they secretly wish that they themselves may have
the opportunity to evade the demands of law’s authority. In addition, a prefer-
ence for a certain rule of recognition must not include unrestrained and ‘whole-
hearted’ acceptance—such a preference can be stable if alternative and superior
rules are hard to realise and if the costs for a ‘constitutional change’ are too
high. Acquiescence instead of agreement could be sufﬁcient if the difﬁculties
of re-coordinating on an alternative arrangement are prohibitive (Hardin 1999,
141ff.).
It is likewise not such an extraordinary challenge for rational choice theory
to explain legal systems in authoritarian regimes in which a rule of recogni-
tion in the particular interest of a ruling oligarchy can—possibly in a pact with
certain other elites in the population (Weingast 1997)—be enforced by oppres-
sion and coercion against the large majority of the rest of society including most
of the judges and other administrative ofﬁcials. An internal point of view in
the enforcement sense would, under such circumstances, be limited to a small
subgroup of a society who themselves enjoy the privilege of being in the role
of rule-authors only and are dispensed from the duties they impose on others.
If it were true, as Gordon Tullock once put it, that from the perspective of ra-
tional choice theory the equilibrium of human society eventually is despotism
(Tullock 1987, 190) then it would be anyway the most plausible outcome for ra-
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enforcement sense is regularly detached from an internal point of view in the
compliance sense.
In summary, also in the case of a rule of recognition, the conceptual condi-
tions for the existence of such a rule do not logically exclude a rational choice
approach. Just as with the existence of social rules in general, the existence of a
rule of recognition implies reference to an internal point of view in the enforce-
ment sense which is compatible with a rational explanation on the basis of the
preferences of utility-maximising actors. But again, we can treat Hart’s stronger
claim about the necessity of an internal point of view in the compliance sense
as an empirical hypothesis about the existence conditions for legal systems. If
such an assumption were true, then at least a relevant subset of a legal com-
munity must accept a rule of recognition as a normative standard for their own
behaviour to ensure its existence and, by that, the existence of the whole legal
order.
Would the truth of this hypothesis subvert a rational choice explanation? To
begin with, it has to be conceded that its truth seems to be quite plausible, at
least for a rule of law in non-dictatorial regimes. It is hard to imagine that
a complex and well-ordered legal system can survive and keep its unity if all
members of this system reveal a preference to individually defect from its rules,
irrespective of whether the other members conform to them or not. It may be
possible, as already noted, that a cleverly ruled authoritarian regime or a dicta-
torship by a trickily designed system of sanctioning and an artiﬁcially created
‘pluralistic ignorance’ could effectively confer power to a ruler even if everybody
in this system were to use all opportunities to realise some extra personal gains.
But if we look at legal systems with a stable rule of law, such a constellation
seems highly unlikely as such systems usually work efﬁciently without an elab-
orate system of complete control and omnipresent sanctions (Baurmann 1996,
261ff.).
However, the requirement of an internal point of view in the compliance
sense does not exclude a rational choice explanation, neither in regard to rules
of recognition. Equally as in the case of other rules, rational utility-maximisers
will prefer rules of recognition as normative standards for their own behaviour
if these rules solve coordination problems.2 As already emphasized, the essen-
tial quality of a solution of a coordination problem is the fact that actors have
incentives to abide by a common practice as long as others behave accordingly.
Now, in the case of a rule of recognition, it is actually even more plausible
than in the case of primary social rules that such a rule could indeed have the
function of solving coordination problems. As was pointed out earlier, many im-
portant primary social rules are initially confronted with cooperation problems
2 The assumption that rules of recognition solve coordination problems is—explicitly or implicitly—
part of the co-called ‘conventionality-thesis’ which claims that a rule of recognition exists as a
“coordination convention” (Coleman, J. 2001; Lagerspetz 1995; Postema 1982) or a “constitutive
convention” (Marmor 2001). According to Julie Dickson’s thorough analysis, Hart’s own position
changes from his original account in the 1st edition of the Concept of Law in which nothing sup-
ports the idea “that Hart understood the rule of recognition as a conventional rule” (Dickson 2007,
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in which incentive structures favour defection. Even if these situations are em-
bedded in empirical conditions that convert them into coordination problems,
the underlying preferences for unilateral deviation survive under the surface of
mutual cooperation and endanger the stability of social rules.
This could be different in the case of rules of recognition. Such rules can
function from the outset as solutions to coordination problems that unambigu-
ously reward conditional conformity to a common practice. We can illustrate
this with the situation of judges and other state ofﬁcials who play a key role in
the enforcement and execution of the laws of a legal community. Without a rule
of recognition that ﬁxes an authoritative source for valid laws, judges and other
ofﬁcials would ﬁgure out by themselves according to their own judgement and
personal evaluation which rules ‘exist’ in their community that they should back
with formal sanctions and enforce as laws. These unofﬁcial rules would not form
a coherent system, but would give cause for concern about their exact content
and scope, and stable mutual expectations would be hardly attainable. A rule of
recognition is the instrument, as Hart emphasises, to overcome this uncertainty
(92).
For actors who are in the role of applying and executing the law, an elimina-
tion of uncertainty through a rule of recognition would be a solution to a coordi-
nation problem if two conditions are met: ﬁrst, they prefer a rule of recognition
as a normative standard for legal validity in their group as a whole to overcome
the general problem of uncertainty. Second, they prefer a rule of recognition as
normative standard for their own judgements to resolve the individual prob-
lem of uncertainty. Uncertainty can be experienced as an individual problem
by judges or other ofﬁcial executioners of law because uncertainty about which
rule is valid law complicates the fulﬁlment of their professional roles und in-
volves additional personal efforts and risks. To abide by a rule of recognition as
a normative standard for legal validity can signiﬁcantly reduce decision costs in
identifying and executing laws and also substantially weaken personal account-
ability and responsibility for legal judgements. Under these conditions, judges
and other executioners of law can have prudential reasons to follow a rule of
recognition that authorises a legislator and ﬁxes sufﬁciently clear criteria for
legal validity—given that this is a common practice and sufﬁciently many other
members of a legal community conﬁrm, support and carry out decisions accord-
ing to this rule as well.
Therefore, as long as a rule of recognition is ﬁrmly embedded in a social
practice, it could quite well be imagined that judges and administrative ofﬁcials
would have no additional advantage if they did not use this rule as an instru-
ment to identify valid laws and apply them to the cases in front of them. The
chances, therefore, are not so bad that rational choice theory can explain the
existence and unity of a legal system even if it is empirically a necessary con-
dition that a relevant subset of members of the legal system act as conditional
rule-followers.46 Michael Baurmann
However, even in the case of a legal system, it could be possible that an inter-
nal point of view in the compliance sense is not sufﬁcient and that an internal
point of view in the commitment or even in the categorical sense is an empir-
ically necessary condition for a rule of recognition and a legal system to exist.
This could be the case, for example, if the “veil of insigniﬁcance” (Kliemt 1986)
or the ‘veil of anonymity’ is so opaque that judges and other ofﬁcials regularly
face substantial incentives to deviate from the rule of recognition because they
can expect to realise additional advantages or relief. Under such circumstances,
conditional or categorical ‘commitment’ would be required to overrule utility-
maximisation and temptations to escape from law’s empire. It could also be pos-
sible that already the general acceptance of a rule of recognition as a common
standard for a legal community would have to be based on ‘ideal values’ that
transcend individual interests because, for example, the participants in consti-
tutional choice must take into consideration the interests of others to vote for a
legal system that includes principles of fairness, impartiality and justice.—But
these are questions beyond the scope of this paper.
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